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I    INTRODUCTION 
A    ‘The 9/11 Effect’1 
Terrorism was not invented with the September 11, 2011 (9/11), terrorist attacks 
on the United States. Nevertheless, the coordinated attacks that killed almost 3,000 
people were unprecedented as a single act of terrorism. So, too, was the global 
response to those events. Although individual countries had panicked and reacted 
to terrorism with repressive and ineffective laws and measures before, the 
response to 9/11 was an unprecedented global phenomenon. … All countries 
responded in a manner that reflected their own particular histories and legal, 
political, and social cultures.2 
International terrorism poses serious threats to the societies it affects. The 
counter-terrorism measures adopted since 2001 have sought to limit the advance 
of terrorism but, in the process, also created enormous challenges for 
(transnational) constitutionalism. Long-held and cherished principles relating to 
democracy, the rule of law and the protection of a wide range of human rights 
have come under increasing strain. Legislative authority to shoot down hijacked 
aircrafts3 or to use lethal drones against suspected terrorists4 affect the right to 
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University Faculty of Law International Collaboration Grant. A former version of this article was 
presented at a workshop of the International Association of Constitutional Law Research Group on 
Constitutional Responses to Terrorism: Konrad Lachmayer, ‘Rethinking Privacy beyond Borders’ (Paper 
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1  Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counterterrorism (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
2  Ibid 1. 
3  Oliver Lepsius, ‘Human Dignity and the Downing of Aircraft: The German Federal Constitutional Court 
Strikes Down a Prominent Anti-terrorism Provision in the New Air-Transport Security Act’ (2006) 7 
German Law Journal 761, 766–72.  
4  See David Cole, ‘How We Made Killing Easy’ on NYRblog, The New York Review of Books, NYRblog 
(6 February 2013) <http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/feb/06/drones-killing-made-easy>; 
Jamie L Kleidman, ‘The Constitutionality of the Predator Drone Program’ (2010) 4 Vienna Journal on 
International Constitutional Law 359. 
2014 Thematic: The Challenge to Privacy 749 
life; waterboarding of prisoners and other inhumane practices contravene the 
prohibition of torture; 5  extraordinary renditions and black sites circumvent 
constitutionally protected rights and processes, including the right to freedom  
and security,6 the right to a fair trial and due process for suspected terrorists;7  
ill-defined terrorism offences undermine the rule of law and personal  
freedom; 8  blanket suspicion of Muslims as terror sympathisers impacts on 
freedom of religion and leads to unfair discrimination;9 and mass surveillance of 
communication sweeps away the right to privacy. 
This article explores how internet surveillance in the name of counter-
terrorism challenges privacy. In Part II, the article analyses the international 
dimension of counter-terrorism measures and the conceptualisation of data 
protection and privacy in the European Union (‘EU’), the United States of 
America (‘US’) and Australia. Part III compares the different concepts of data 
protection and privacy, and explores the prospects of an international legal 
framework for the protection of privacy. Part IV concludes that work on 
international data protection and privacy standards, while urgently needed, 
remains a long-term vision with particularly uncertain prospects as far as anti-
terrorism and national security measures are concerned. 
 
B    The Privacy Challenge 
Counter-terrorism measures have broken many taboos regarding the rule of 
law in democratic countries. While torture, detention and interrogation target 
individuals in highly confronting ways, mass surveillance operates more subtly 
but affects the community at large. The erosion of core aspects of individual 
privacy can fundamentally alter the nature of human behaviour and interaction, 
our sense of personal freedom and the ethos of democratic societies. 
The revelations in particular by the former Central Intelligence Agency 
(‘CIA’) contractor, Edward Snowden, have shown that massive surveillance of 
ordinary citizens on an unprecedented scale by law enforcement and national 
security agencies is now commonplace: it includes internet surveillance, video 
surveillance of public spaces, electronic eavesdropping, data retention, 
monitoring of bank accounts and social media, the sharing of air travel booking 
information, large scale intrusions into email, web chat and data held in cloud 
storage etc. Moreover, the different forms of data gathering can be combined 
                                                
5  See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House’ (2005) 105 
Columbia Law Review 1681.  
6  Johan Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1. 
7  Federico Fabbrini, ‘The Role of the Judiciary in Times of Emergency: Judicial Review of Counter-
Terrorism Measures in the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 28 
Yearbook of European Law 664; Christina Eckes, EU Counterterrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: 
The Case of Individual Sanctions (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
8  Roach, above n 1, 227–9. 
9  See Jocelyne Cesari (ed), Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion, Politics and Law (Routledge, 2010).  
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with sophisticated data mining,10 dragnet investigations and big data analysis.11 
Technological developments which result in ever-increasing amounts of data 
logging our communications and recording our daily activities create new 
possibilities for covert risk profiling and discriminatory treatment that are often 
beyond legal challenge. In their totality, these forms of information technology-
based counter-terrorism measures raise serious constitutional concerns. 
The new possibilities for state surveillance to dig deep into our social 
interactions, behaviour, and personality do not stop at national borders. Data 
exchange between governments and agencies, cooperation with and inquiries at 
private companies, international agreements and security cooperation create new 
data that provide our own or foreign governments with further insight into our 
activities and intentions. Internet communications are subject to direct or indirect 
intrusion into computers, computer systems, clouds, private chat rooms, social 
media and email accounts.12 Access to telecommunication networks does not 
only include eavesdropping on our conversations but also many informational 
by-products, including metadata and, in the era of smartphones, geolocation data. 
Wiretapping, the use of spy satellites and traditional foreign espionage 
supplement these sources of information. 
These new surveillance practices are challenging the concept of privacy in 
many ways. Indeed, it can be asked how privacy can still be sensibly safeguarded 
in this new environment. In international human rights law, privacy enjoys 
significant but not unlimited protection. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights states that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.’13 Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (‘ICCPR’),14 the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, now known as the European Convention on Human 
                                                
10 Fred H Cate, ‘Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework’ (2008) 43 Harvard Civil 
Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review 435. 
11  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We 
Live, Work, and Think (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013). 
12  Regarding the changing role of the individual in international conventions relating transborder data flows, 
see Christopher Kuner, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
36–7. 
13  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN 
Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). On the continuing relevance of the Universal Declaration, see Jochen 
von Bernstorff, ‘The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and 
Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 903. 
14  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 17. In relation to extraterritorial surveillance and 
interception of communication, there is also a jurisdictional issue of whether human rights instruments 
have application to foreign intelligence activities: see also Marko Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and 
Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age’ (2014) forthcoming Harvard International Law 
Journal. 
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Rights (‘ECHR’),15 and the American Convention on Human Rights16 recognise 
respect for private life as a human right. Yet, privacy is not an absolute right. In 
practical terms, it is only guaranteed to the extent that it is not outweighed by 
countervailing public interests or by conflicting rights held by others. Under the 
ECHR, which probably contains the richest human rights jurisprudence relating 
to the right to privacy, conflicting human rights positions have to be resolved by 
reference to the principle of proportionality, under which each human right can 
only be limited as far as is necessary for the protection of the conflicting human 
rights. In the context of counter-terrorism measures, these will normally justify a 
curtailment of privacy for the protection of state security, public safety or public 
order. 
While there is a shared discourse on the framework of privacy protection at 
an international level, international human rights instruments tend to give states a 
‘margin of appreciation’17 as to how privacy is to be effected and how it is to be 
balanced against conflicting public interests. This has resulted in significant 
differences concerning the nature and precise extent of privacy protection 
between jurisdictions. Even among liberal Western democracies, there is no 
consensus regarding the status that privacy should enjoy at a constitutional level. 
In some countries, for example, Germany, constitutional jurisprudence plays a 
pivotal role in the protection of privacy. In other countries, such as Australia, 
privacy is not a constitutionally protected value. 
Since the days of Warren and Brandeis,18 debate on privacy has always been 
shaped by new technological developments. However, the contemporary 
dimension of intrusion goes far beyond previously existing technologies and is 
powerfully supported by anti-terrorism rhetoric. Cultural concepts of privacy 
have always varied between different states and societies in the world but the 
contemporary and emerging techniques of intrusion into privacy create a new 
global standard of possibilities. Privacy protections no longer keep up with these 
developments: neither nationally with the aim of limiting government usage of 
the new surveillance technologies nor internationally with the aim of adopting 
                                                
15  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocol No 14 to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control 
System of the Convention, opened for signature 13 May 2004, CETS No 194 (entered into force 1 June 
2010) art 8; see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/389, arts 7–8.  
16  American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 17955 (entered into 
force 18 July 1978). 
17  The ‘margin of appreciation’ is a doctrine developed by the European Court of Human Rights. The term 
refers to the space for manoeuvre that is accorded to national authorities in fulfilling their obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights. The margin of appreciation differs depending on the 
circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms engaged. See, eg, Dean Spielmann, ‘Whither the 
Margin of Appreciation?’ (Speech delivered at the Current Legal Problems Lecture Series, University 
College London, 20 March 2014) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20140320_London_ 
ENG.pdf>. 
18  Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 195 
(referring to ‘recent inventions’ such as ‘[i]nstantaneous photographs’).  
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universal standards of privacy protection. Safeguarding privacy in times of 
terrorism requires the reaffirmation of the rule of law nationally and an 
intercultural dialogue on privacy internationally.19 
 
II    COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON PRIVACY – COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS 
A    The European Union 
1 Counter-Terrorism Surveillance Measures 
During the last decade, the EU intensified its counter-terrorism activities in 
many ways. 20  After 9/11, initiatives to improve EU police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters included a strong counter-terrorism component.21 
The terrorist attacks in Madrid22 and London23 provided the political impetus for 
further expansion of these initiatives and led most prominently to the enactment 
of the so-called Data Retention Directive.24 Based on the EU competence of legal 
harmonisation in the common market,25 the Data Retention Directive aimed at 
harmonising the obligations of providers of public electronic communications 
services or networks to retain certain categories of traffic and location data 
generated or processed by them.26 The categories included data necessary to trace 
and identify the source and the destination of any electronic (tele)communication 
as well as the date, time, duration and type of this communication.27 While the 
Data Retention Directive expressly excluded retention of data revealing the 
content of the communication,28 it created a highly contentious basis for privacy 
invasion by state authorities. The CJEU struck down the Data Retention 
                                                
19  David Cole, ‘Preserving Privacy in a Digital Age: Lessons of Comparative Constitutionalism’, in Fergal 
Davis, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams (eds), Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and Comparative 
Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2014) 95. 
20  See Cian C Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-emption and the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing, 
2012). 
21  See, eg, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union 
[2005] OJ C 53/1. 
22  The Madrid train bombings took place on 11 March 2004.  
23  The London bombings took place on 7 July 2005.  
24  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention 
of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic 
Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
[2006] OJ L 105/54 (‘Data Retention Directive’). See, eg, Theodore Konstadinides, ‘Mass Surveillance 
and Data Protection in EU Law – The Data Retention Directive Saga’ in Maria Bergström and Anna 
Jonsson Cornell (eds), European Police and Criminal Law Cooperation (Hart Publishing, 2013) 69. 
25  The Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) rejected an action for annulment on the basis of 
lack of competence. See Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Court of 
Justice of the European Union, C-301/06, 10 February 2009). 
26  Data Retention Directive [2006] OJ L 105/54, arts 1(1)–(2). 
27  Data Retention Directive [2006] OJ L 105/54, art 5. 
28  Data Retention Directive [2006] OJ L 105/54, art 5(2). 
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Directive in April 2014 as a disproportionate intrusion into the rights to privacy 
and data protection,29 yet it continues to illustrate the status of personal data 
protection in Europe. 
To understand its significance, it is important to recall some major elements 
of the Data Retention Directive. In its first recital the Data Retention Directive 
invoked data protection and the right to privacy; however, the Data Retention 
Directive primarily operated to limit and restrict these rights. While counter-
terrorism provided the context for enacting the Data Retention Directive,30 the 
Data Retention Directive itself expressed its purposes more widely. The data had 
to be retained, for a period between six months and two years, to ‘ensure that 
[they] are available for the purpose of the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national 
law.’31 In other words, the Data Retention Directive provided each member state 
with wide discretion to define the parameters for use of the retained data by its 
police, the judiciary or intelligence agencies, having regard to its own 
institutional and constitutional framework.32 Its contested nature meant that the 
transposition of the Data Retention Directive into national law remained 
incomplete. When the German Constitutional Court declared the transposition of 
the Data Retention Directive into German law to be unconstitutional, the German 
government made no further attempt of transposition. 33  While the German 
Constitutional Court did not decide on compatibility of the Data Rentention 
Directive with the German Constitution, it held that the constitutional principle 
of proportionality demanded more detailed provisions regarding data security, 
                                                
29  See Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; Kärntner 
Landesregierung v Seitlinger (European Court of Justice, C-293/12; C-59/14, 8 April 2014) [58]. 
30  See recital 10 of the Data Retention Directive [2006] OJ L 105/54: ‘On 13 July 2005, the Council 
reaffirmed in its declaration condemning the terrorist attacks on London the need to adopt common 
measures on the retention of telecommunications data as soon as possible.’ 
31  Data Retention Directive [2006] OJ L 105/54, art 1(1). 
32  The use of data was completely at the discretion of the member states. The Data Retention Directive only 
required the member states to adopt rules for data retention for telecommunication providers, but did not 
regulate in which form, if any, member state authorities used such data other than providing that the 
procedure and conditions for access  
in accordance with necessity and proportionality requirements shall be defined by each member state in its 
national law, subject to the relevant provisions of European Union law or public international law, and in 
particular the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.  
  Data Retention Directive [2006] OJ L 105/54, art 4. 
33  Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Constitutional Court], 1 BvR 256/08, 2 March 2010 reported in 
(2010) BVerfGE 125, 260. See also Christian DeSimone, ‘Pitting Karlsruhe against Luxembourg? 
German Data Protection and the Contested Implementation of the EU Data Retention Directive’ (2010) 
11 German Law Journal 291. 
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transparency and legal protection in the German Act transposing the Data 
Retention Directive.34 
The majority of member states have limited the purpose of data retention to 
serious crime, but in 2011 there were eight member states which allowed its  
use in relation to all criminal offences and for crime prevention, or on  
general grounds of national or state and/or public security.35 The Data Retention 
Directive was not unusual in this regard.36 New police and judicial powers have 
often been introduced as counter-terrorism measures but have then been made 
available to all (or at least many others) forms of criminal activities, especially 
organised crime. Once anti-terrorism has been used as the political justification 
for introducing a particular measure, there is a temptation for police and other 
agencies to lobby for an expansion of the new powers to deal with other forms of 
criminality. 
The Data Retention Directive was just one, but a prominent, example of EU 
counter-terrorism policy.37 Other activities related to counter-terrorism and the 
use of personal data include the establishment and development of Europol,38 the 
establishment of EU Intelligence Analysis Centre,39 the Schengen Information 
System, 40  the Prüm Convention, 41  European Criminal Records Information 
                                                
34  See with regard to legal challenges in other countries Chris Jones and Ben Hayes, ‘The EU Data 
Retention Directive: A Case Study in the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy’ 
(Report No D2.4, Securing Europe through Counter-Terrorism: Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 7 
November 2013) 22 <http://secile.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Data-Retention-Directive-in-Europe-
A-Case-Study.pdf>. 
35  Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Evaluation Report on the 
Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC) [2011] COM(2011) 225, 6. 
36  See Maria Tzanou, ‘The EU as an Emerging “Surveillance Society”: The Function Creep Case Study and 
Challenges to Privacy and Data Protection’ (2010) 4 Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 
407. 
37  Francesca Bignami, ‘Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The Data Retention 
Directive’ (2007) 8 Chicago Journal of International Law 233. 
38  See Council Decision of 6 April 2009 Establishing the European Police Office (Europol) (2009/371/JHA) 
[2009] OJ L 121/37; see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol) and Repealing 
Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA, Communication [2013] COM(2013) 173.  
39  Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 
2013) 212–29. 
40  See Jens-Peter Schneider, ‘European Information Systems and Data Protection as Elements of the 
European Administrative Union’ in Dieter Dörr and Russell L Weaver (eds), The Right to Privacy in the 
Light of Media Convergence: Perspectives from Three Continents (De Gruyter, 2012) 374, 380–2. 
41  See Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of 
Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Austria on the Stepping Up of Cross-Border Cooperation, Particularly in Combating 
Terrorism, Cross-Border Crime and Illegal Migration, signed 27 May 2005, 2617 UNTS 46562 (entered 
into force 1 November 2006) (‘Prüm Convention’); see also the implementation of the Prüm Convention 
into the EU legal framework by Council Decision (2008/615/JHA) on the Stepping Up of Cross-Border 
Cooperation, Particularly in Combating Terrorism and Cross-border Crime [2008] OJ L 210/1 (‘Council 
Decision (2008/615/JHA)’).  
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System,42 and the attempts to establish a ‘principle of availability’ in police 
cooperation 43  and to enact an EU Passenger Name Record (‘EU PNR’) 
directive.44 
All these counter-terrorism measures have had a dimension extending beyond 
the EU. The Data Retention Directive did not focus on EU citizens but on all 
communications which utilised telecommunication infrastructure located in the 
EU.45 This affected all persons using the internet within the EU, but also persons 
outside the EU who used telecommunication providers and their services on EU 
territory or by EU providers. Moreover, the storage of data leads to 
communication data with regard to persons outside the Union, for example, if 
somebody inside the EU contacts a person, an email address or a website outside 
the EU. 
European counter-terrorism measures are enforced within the EU but they are 
intended to gain as much data as possible, also beyond the EU territory. The 
international reach, which is characteristic of the ‘new’ forms of terrorism, 
requires cross-border strategies also for the fight against it. The EU is therefore 
part of international agreements to foster cooperation against international 
terrorism: the prominent examples are the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
Agreement (‘TFTP Agreement’)46 and the Passenger Name Record Agreements 
(‘PNR Agreements’)47 with the US or Australia. Other initiatives, like the efforts 
for an EU-PNR directive48 or Europol’s cooperation agreements with non-EU 
                                                
42  See Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA on the Organisation and Content of the Exchange of 
Information Extracted from the Criminal Record between Member States [2009] OJ L 93/23; Council 
Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the Establishment of the European Criminal Records 
Information System (ECRIS) in Application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA [2009] 
OJ L 93/33. 
43  See The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union [2005] 
OJ C 53/1. 
44  See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Use of Passenger 
Name Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Offences 
and Serious Crime [2011] COM(2011) 32. 
45  Data Retention Directive [2006] OJ L 105/54, art 3(2):  
The obligation to retain data provided for in paragraph 1 shall include the retention of the data specified in 
Article 5 relating to unsuccessful call attempts where those data are generated or processed, and stored (as 
regards telephony data) or logged (as regards Internet data), by providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of a public communications network within the jurisdiction of the Member 
State concerned in the process of supplying the communication services concerned. 
46  Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and 
Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of 
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program [2010] OJ L 195/5; see also Ariadna Ripoll Servent and Alex 
MacKenzie, ‘The European Parliament as a “Norm Taker”? EU-US Relations after the SWIFT 
Agreement’ (2012) 17(2/1) European Foreign Affairs Review 71. 
47  Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of 
Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security [2012] OJ L 215/5; 
Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
[2012] OJ L 186/4. 
48  See European Commission, above n 44.  
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countries,49 also show the intention of the EU to cooperate on information sharing 
internationally.50 
 
2 Data Protection and Counter-Terrorism 
The centrepiece of EU regulation in the field of data protection is Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data (‘Directive 95/46/EC’).51 Like all directives, 
it is addressed to the member states and required transposition into national law 
through the enactment of data protection legislation in each member state. Even 
though the directive established minimum standards of data protection in all EU 
member states,52 its scope of application has expressly been limited to exclude 
data protection in the context of public and state security, defence, as well as 
criminal law. Post 2001, member states relatively quickly agreed on the necessity 
of EU-wide counter-terrorism measures but the negotiations for a more general 
EU data protection framework in the field of police cooperation were a relatively 
lengthy process. However, in 2008, the EU adopted Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2009 on the Protection of Personal 
Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters,53 which is still in force. 
This Framework Decision requires member states to ‘protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons’ when their personal data are processed 
‘for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties’.54 In article 13, the 
Framework Decision imposes conditions on the data transfer by national 
authorities to third states and international bodies. These conditions include that 
the transfer must be necessary for criminal law enforcement; must only be to 
competent authorities; and that the recipient state or international body ensures 
an adequate standard of data protection. However, the exclusion of some of the 
most important forms of cooperation, like the Schengen Information System, 
Europol or the Prüm Convention, 55  has significantly limited the protections 
provided by the Framework Decision.56 In relation to exchange of information for 
                                                
49  See Europol, External Cooperation (2014) <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/external-
cooperation-31>.  
50  The EU, however, also took over international security strategies of the US, see Javier Argomaniz, ‘When 
the EU Is the “Norm-Taker”: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the EU’s Internalisation of 
US Border Security Norms’ (2009) 31 Journal of European Integration 119. 
51  [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
52  See Christopher Kuner, European Data Protection Law: Corporate Compliance and Regulation (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2007).  
53  [2008] OJ L 350/60 (‘Framework Decision’).  
54  Framework Decision [2008] OJ L 350/60, art 1(2). 
55  See Prüm Convention; see also the implementation of the Prüm Convention into the EU legal framework 
by Council Decision (2008/615/JHA) [2008] OJ L 210/1. 
56  Framework Decision [2008] OJ L 350/60, recital 39. 
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counter-terrorism, the scope of the Framework Decision is further reduced by its 
article 1(4), which provides that the Framework Decision is ‘without prejudice to 
essential national security interests and specific intelligence activities in the field 
of national security’. Moreover, some rights are subject to exceptions, which can 
make it difficult for individuals to obtain effective legal protection. For example, 
while article 17 guarantees the right of the individual to access processed 
personal data, this right can be restricted in national legislation and the reasons 
for restriction are formulated in very broad terms.57 
The Lisbon Treaty,58 which entered into force in 2009, completely changed 
the institutional arrangements for police and judicial cooperation as well as for 
data protection in the EU. Because of the integration of the so-called ‘third pillar’ 
(ie police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters), matters of police 
cooperation, including Europol, are now dealt with in articles 87–9 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’).59 This means that relevant 
measures, including instruments concerning the ‘collection, storage, processing, 
analysis and exchange of relevant information’60 now fall under the ordinary 
legislative procedure. This simplifies the process for the adoption of new 
counter-terrorism measures and strengthens the role of the European Parliament. 
As a further important change, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘CFR’) has 
become binding EU constitutional law. Article 8 of the CFR includes a right to 
the ‘protection of personal data’.61 This right is complemented by the provision of 
article 16 of the TFEU, which confirms this right and guarantees the competence 
of the Union to regulate data protection for the whole Union including its 
member states. 
                                                
57  See Framework Decision [2008] OJ L 350/60, art 17(2), which allows restrictions which are a  
necessary and proportional measure: 
(a) to avoid obstructing official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures; 
(b) to avoid prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences or 
for the execution of criminal penalties; 
(c) to protect public security; 
(d) to protect national security; 
(e) to protect the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others. 
58  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, signed 13 December 2007, [2007] OJ C 306/1 (entered into force 1 December 2009) 
(‘Lisbon Treaty’). 
59  The TFEU also widened the mandate of Europol: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/47, art 88(1). 
60  TFEU [2010] OJ C 83/47, art 88(2)(a). 
61  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/01, art 8 (‘CFR’):  
Protection of personal data 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access 
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
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This new European constitutional situation with regard to data protection 
after the Lisbon Treaty has provided the basis for developing a new data 
protection framework. In January 2012, the EU Commission presented 
proposals 62  for a regulation setting out a general EU framework for data 
protection (to replace Directive 95/46/EC)63 and for a directive on the protection 
of personal data processed for the purposes of criminal law enforcement (to 
replace Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA).64 After an extensive review by the 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 
(‘LIBE Committee’), with the general aim of achieving more clarity and a more 
appropriate balance between the conflicting human rights positions,65 a modified 
proposal is currently awaiting further parliamentary action. 
The Draft Directive66  is concerned with the protection of personal data 
processed for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offences. 67  This also includes offences related to 
terrorism. However, the Draft Directive is not intended to apply to the processing 
of personal data ‘in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of 
Union law, in particular concerning national security’,68 or to data processed ‘by 
the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’, such as Europol or 
Eurojust. 69  The Draft Directive therefore still suffers from some of the 
deficiencies of the framework decision it would replace, but it would nonetheless 
be a major step towards fostering a European approach to data protection with 
regard to counter-terrorism activities. 
                                                
62  Summarised by Viviane Reding, ‘The European Data Protection Framework for the Twenty-First 
Century’ (2012) 2 International Data Privacy Law 119. 
63  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 
(General Data Protection Regulation) [2012] COM(2012) 11. In contrast to a directive, a regulation is 
directly applicable in the member states, without the need for national transposition: TFEU [2010] OJ C 
83/47, art 288. 
64  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of 
Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal 
Penalties, and the Free Movement of Such Data [2012] COM(2012) 10 (‘Draft Directive’). 
65  Eg, the LIBE Committee introduced new provisions with regard to further processing for incompatible 
purposes (article 7a), the processing of genetic data (article 8a), general principles for data subject rights 
(article 10a), a data protection impact assessment (article 25a), joint operations (article 48a), and 
transmission of personal data to other authorities or private parties in the Union (article 55a): Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), A7-0402/2013.  
66  For a comparison between the Framework Decision [2008] OJ L 350/60 and the Draft Directive [2012] 
COM(2012) 10, see Reding, above n 62, 122–3. 
67  Draft Directive [2012] COM(2012) 10, art 1(1).  
68  Draft Directive [2012] COM(2012) 10, art 2(3)(a). Matters relating to national security and intelligence 
agencies are not included in the competences of the European Union.  
69  Draft Directive [2012] COM(2012) 10, art 2(2)(b), recital 15. 
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Any reform of the EU data protection framework now also needs to have 
regard to the statements contained in the decision of the CJEU on the Data 
Retention Directive. In this important decision, the Court held that the Data 
Retention Directive was invalid because it constituted a disproportionate 
interference with the right to respect for private life and with the right to the 
protection of personal data, as enshrined in articles 7 and 8 of the CFR 
respectively.70 The Court held that the EU legislator had failed to establish ‘clear 
and precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in question 
and imposing minimum safeguards’ against abuse and unlawful access of the 
data retained.71 The Data Retention Directive was held to apply too broadly 
because it did ‘not provide for any exception, with the result that it applies even 
to persons whose communications are subject, according to rules of national law, 
to the obligation of professional secrecy.’72 The Data Retention Directive further 
failed to ‘lay down any objective criterion by which to determine the limits of the 
access of the competent national authorities to the data and their subsequent use 
for the purposes of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions concerning 
offences’.73 Many of the deficiencies of the Data Retention Directive, including 
the vague definition of the purpose and limits of data retention, can be attributed 
to competence issues. At the time of its enactment in 2006, a framework decision 
concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters would have 
required unanimity of Council. When this was unattainable, the Data Retention 
Directive was based on the ‘harmonisation competence’ of the internal market, 
which allowed its enactment with a qualified majority but did not enable it to 
address issues of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
While the decision of the CJEU does not preclude the enactment of a new 
directive on data retention, now based on the broader competence of the Lisbon 
Treaty, such an initiative is currently unlikely. In any event, it would need to 
carefully consider the Court’s statements relating to the definition of the purpose 
and limits of data retention, as well as of the substantive and procedural 
safeguards that would apply to access and subsequent use of the data by 
competent national authorities. In the meantime, each member state is called 
upon to determine the scope and limits of data retention in its national laws, 
having regard to its specific constitutional framework.74 
The preceding discussion of the EU instruments in the field of data protection 
demonstrates the significance of the multiple constitutional protections existing 
in this area – specifically, the right to the protection of personal data in article 8 
                                                
70  Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; Kärntner 
Landesregierung v Seitlinger (European Court of Justice, C-293/12; C-59/14, 8 April 2014) [69]. 
71  Ibid [54]. 
72  Ibid [58]. 
73  Ibid [60]. 
74  Most recently the Austrian Constitutional Court declared the Austrian statutory provisions on data 
retention to be ‘an excessive interference’ with the right to data protection and declared them to be void 
and unconstitutional: Verfassungsgerichtshof [Austrian Constitutional Court], G 47/2012, 27 June 2014. 
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of the CFR and, more generally, the right to respect for one’s private life in 
article 7 of the CFR and article 8 of the ECHR. 75  The strength of these 
constitutional protections has been confirmed in the CJEU’s judgment on the 
Data Retention Directive. The proposed new data protection framework of the 
EU is expected to build upon these foundations and to create an effective 
approach towards the collection, storage and use of personal data by police and 
criminal authorities. However, the activities of intelligence agencies and their use 
of personal data will remain within the domestic sphere of the member states and, 
thus, be outside the purview of the EU’s data protection regime. 
 
3 International Dimension  
The new EU data protection framework for police and judicial cooperation 
also provides general principles for the international transfer of personal data 
(article 33 of the Draft Directive). Personal data can be transferred to third 
countries or international organisations if this is necessary for criminal law 
enforcement and provided that there is either an adequacy decision of the 
European Commission (article 34 of the Draft Directive) or that appropriate 
safeguards (article 35 of the Draft Directive) are in place. In addition to these 
formal avenues, article 36 of the Draft Directive allows derogations from articles 
34 and 35 to transfer personal data to a third country in exceptional 
circumstances, for example, if ‘the transfer of the data is essential for the 
prevention of an immediate and serious threat to public security of a Member 
State or a third country’,76 which may cover cases of a specific terror threat. The 
transfer is also possible if, more broadly, it is ‘necessary in individual cases for 
the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties’.77 The European Parliament 
adopted amendments to the Draft Directive proposed by the LIBE Committee, 
which provided further safeguards including a prohibition on the ‘frequent 
massive transfer of data’ and strict limitations on transfers on the basis of 
derogations. 78  The overall concept of derogation possibilities, however, has 
remained the same. 
                                                
75  CFR [2000] OJ C 364/01, art 52(3): ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ 
76  See Draft Directive [2012] COM(2012) 10, art 36(2)(c).  
77  See Draft Directive [2012] COM(2012) 10, art 36(2)(d). 
78  See European Parliament, Legislative Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the Draft Directive, A7-
0403/2013, Amendment 99, art 36:  
2b. All transfers of data decided on the basis of derogations shall be duly justified and shall be limited to 
what is strictly necessary, and frequent massive transfers of data shall not be allowed.  
2c. The decision for transfers under paragraph 2 [refers to the possibility of derogation] must be made by 
duly authorised staff. These transfers must be documented and the documentation must be made available 
to the supervisory authority on request, including the date and time of the transfer, information about the 
recipient authority, the justification for the transfer and the data transferred. 
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Notably, the EU also puts data protection policy on its foreign affairs 
agenda.79 Article 38 of the Draft Directive tasks the Commission and the member 
states with improving international cooperation regarding the protection of 
personal data. The Union aims to ‘develop effective international cooperation 
mechanisms to facilitate the enforcement of legislation for the protection of 
personal data’, ‘international mutual assistance in the enforcement of legislation 
for the protection of personal data’ and to ‘promote the exchange and 
documentation of personal data protection legislation and practice’.80 Thus, the 
EU’s data protection regime with regard to police and judicial cooperation does 
not only affect third countries who wish to cooperate with the EU but the Union 
seeks to export its own visions and concepts of data protection into the world. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The scourge of international terrorism provided the impetus for counter-
terrorism measures at the European level, including initiatives like EU’s Data 
Retention Directive, which sought to create a legal framework for storing internet 
and (tele)communication traffic data for law enforcement and national security 
purposes. The European counter-terrorism measures are not limited to EU 
citizens or EU territories but affect international communication with links to the 
territory of the Union. Moreover, these measures are not restricted to counter-
terrorism but member states are free to allow their use for other law enforcement 
purposes, especially regarding serious crime. 
Alongside the Europeanisation of information technology-based counter-
terrorism measures have been attempts to foster data protection in the Union. The 
recent CJEU’s decision on the invalidity of the Data Retention Directive 
underlines the value attached to privacy in the EU legal order. The new Draft 
Directive on data protection concerning police and judicial cooperation would 
definitely be a major achievement, but nevertheless has significant loopholes. It 
is only directed at member states and thus does not apply to Europol. Broad 
provisions allowing international cooperation to take place on the basis of 
derogation clauses mean that the Draft Directive’s requirements for adequacy or 
appropriate safeguards can be sidestepped. Lastly, and most importantly, national 
security and the activities of intelligence agencies are not included in the EU 
framework. The current and future European frameworks therefore still leave 
much room for national counter-terrorism activities, including mass surveillance, 
that do not need to abide by the EU data protection regime. 
 
                                                
79  On the EU strategies to extend the scope of application of the EU’s Data Protection Directive, see Lokke 
Moerel, ‘The Long Arm of EU Data Protection Law: Does the Data Protection Directive Apply to 
Processing of Personal Data of EU Citizens by Websites Worldwide?’ (2011) 1 International Data 
Privacy Law 28. 
80  See Draft Directive [2012] COM(2012) 10, art 38(1). 
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B    The United States 
1 Counter-Terrorism Surveillance Measures 
The US response to 9/11 dramatically altered many aspects of US law, both 
domestically and regarding its international legal relations. This includes most 
prominently the treatment of terror suspects in Guantánamo and elsewhere with 
all its implications (‘enemy combatants’, ‘military trials’, ‘black sites’),81 but also 
the USA PATRIOT Act82 (‘Patriot Act’) and the massive surveillance of domestic 
and internationals by the National Security Agency (‘NSA’).83 The analysis of 
more than 10 years of US surveillance shows that the legal response to terrorism 
has the following characteristics: measures have been based on the exercise of 
legislative as well as executive powers; there is a sharp cleavage between the 
constitutional protections afforded to US citizens and the significantly lesser 
protections enjoyed by foreigners;84 and there has been reliance on a variety of 
extra-legalistic concepts to avoid legal obligations that would otherwise apply.85 
The most prominent reaction to 9/11 with regard to surveillance was the 
Patriot Act. As Banks has noted, the  
Patriot Act is hardly a code for fighting the war on terrorism, nor one for saving 
the US homeland from another attack. Instead, it is an amalgam of often unrelated 
pieces of authority, most of which simply amend existing laws, and the larger 
share of which are unremarkable complements to existing authority.86  
The Patriot Act provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’) with 
greater powers in the conduct of national security investigations. Independently 
of courts, the FBI can issue National Security Letters to obtain simplified access 
to various information sources, such as the internet, libraries, bank accounts, car 
dealers, post offices, casinos.87 The Patriot Act also provides the basis for the 
bulk collection by the NSA of telephone call records or metadata. This program, 
which records the calling and receiving phone number, as well as time and date 
of most US phone calls but not their contents, has been periodically approved by 
a special secret court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (‘FISC’) 
pursuant to section 215 of the Patriot Act.88 
                                                
81  William C Banks, ‘The United States a Decade after 9/11’ in Victor V Ramraj et al (eds), Global Anti-
terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 449, 453–60; Roach, above n 1. 
82  The title of this 2001 Act (Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272) is a ‘backronym’ that stands for Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. 
83  Roach, above n 1, 184–6. 
84  Milanovic, above n 14. 
85  Roach, above n 1, 163. 
86  Banks, ‘The United States a Decade after 9/11’, above n 81, 470. 
87  Andrew E Nieland, ‘National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act’ (2007) 92 Cornell Law 
Review 1201.  
88  This program has come under sharp criticism by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 
an independent agency appointed by the US President and approved by Congress, which calls for its 
abolition: David Medine et al, ‘Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 
of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’ (Report, 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 23 January 2014).  
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Under another program, the US government collects in the so-called 
‘PRISM’ database, the content of electronic communications, including phone 
calls and emails, where the targets are reasonably believed to be non-US persons 
located outside the US. Amendments of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(‘FISA’) opened up the possibility of undertaking such electronic surveillance  
by authorisation of the Director of National Intelligence.89 This surveillance 
program, which had been established on administrative authorisation, was 
legitimised by section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
Amendments Act of 2008.90 FISA procedures bypassed traditional approaches 
towards criminal investigations (warrant process) and fostered increased 
cooperation between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.91 
The Patriot Act and FISA are the most relevant federal Acts but different 
levels of administration, including the US President, the US government,  
law enforcement and intelligence agencies have introduced numerous  
further surveillance programs.92 The US model of surveillance has therefore been 
described as an executive model of counter-terrorism.93 The government enabled 
various counter-terrorism surveillance programs without congressional approval, 
with legislation also often strengthening the surveillance powers of the 
administration. Temporary measures have often become permanent and the 
complexity of the rules has been steadily increasing. The strengthening of 
administrative powers goes along with closer cooperation between intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement agencies and the weakening of judicial controls. 
More recently, Congress has begun to engage in more intense scrutiny of the 
intelligence services and their surveillance programs. The USA Freedom Act,94 
which has passed the House of Representatives and is currently before the 
Senate, seeks to restrict the surveillance activities under FISA, in particular the 
bulk collection of telephony metadata, and imposes further requirements on 
police authorities regarding the use of personal data, but also extends the Patriot 
Act until 2017. 
Many forms of surveillance target international communication inside and 
outside US territory. The US has concluded various international agreements 
regarding surveillance. The UKUSA Agreement, a treaty between Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US for joint cooperation in signals 
                                                
89  50 USC §§ 1801–85. 
90  Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436. 
91  David Cole, ‘English Lessons: A Comparative Analysis of UK and US Responses to Terrorism’ (2009) 
62 Current Legal Problems 136. 
92  William C Banks, ‘The Death of FISA’ (2007) 91 Minnesota Law Review 1209, 1275–6; Stephanie K 
Pell, ‘Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in the United States’ (2012) 2 International 
Data Privacy Law 245, 249–54; Cate, above n 10, 444–51. 
93  Daphne Barak-Erez, ‘Terrorism Law between the Executive and Legislative Models’ (2009) 57 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 877.  
94  Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-Collection 
and Online Monitoring Act, HR Res 3361, 113th Congress (2014) (‘USA Freedom Act’).  
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intelligence (also known as ‘Five Eyes’), or the TFTP Agreement95 are prominent 
examples. The possibilities of the US regarding international surveillance are 
enormous and, as the Snowden revelations have confirmed, the potential is used 
extensively. As US companies play a crucial role in internet communication, 
surveillance inside the US territory opens up manifold possibilities regarding 
international communication networks. While US surveillance has broad 
international reach, 96  the level of protection afforded to foreigners against 
excessive or unwarranted surveillance is very low. Under the US constitutional 
system, civil liberties are generally assumed to depend on citizenship, providing 
foreigners with very limited protection.97 This also applies to the protection of 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment.98 The constitutional assessment of anti-
terrorism measures therefore draws a sharp distinction between surveillance 
involving US persons and surveillance on non-US persons. 99  However, in 
practice, the US counter-terrorism programs initiated by the administration have 
often not been able to uphold this distinction. Much surveillance is sweeping and 
affects all kinds of personal information, frequently affecting foreigners as well 
as US persons alike. 
The political debate on the US surveillance program in the US is likely to 
remain focused on US interests. Foreigners not permanently residing in the US 
can only expect a reprieve from continued US intrusion if the surveillance, by 
chance or by necessity, also affects the legal rights of US citizens or residents, or 
if the international diplomatic process brings home to the US administration that 
a particular form of surveillance does more harm than good to US interests. 
However, the recent scandals involving US interception of telecommunications 
by foreign heads of state including German Chancellor Angela Merkel100 and the 
US administration’s response to them, demonstrate that even powerful allies 
encounter difficulties in seeking assurances that they be exempt from 
surveillance. 
 
                                                
95  Terrorist Finance Tracking Program Agreement [2010] OJ L 195/5. 
96  Gehan Gunasekara, ‘The “Final” Privacy Frontier? Regulating Transborder Data Flows’ (2007) 17 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 147, 161–2. 
97  On the constitutional right to habeas corpus of non-US nationals imprisoned in Guantanamo, see, eg, 
Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723 (2008). 
98  United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259 (1990). 
99  This differentiation between US persons and non-US persons also underlies the constitutional analysis by 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: see David Medine et al, ‘Report on the Surveillance 
Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’ (Report, Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 2 July 2014) <http://www.pclob.gov/All%20Documents/Report%20 
on%20the%20Section%20702%20Program/PCLOB-Section-702-Report.pdf>. 
100  See, eg, Philip Sherwell, ‘Barack Obama “Approved Tapping Angela Merkel’s Phone 3 Years Ago”’, 
The Telegraph (online), 27 October 2013 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ 
germany/10407282/Barack-Obama-approved-tapping-Angela-Merkels-phone-3-years-ago.html>. 
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2 Privacy and Counter-Terrorism 
The US concept of privacy has a number of legal dimensions: first, the US 
Constitution provides some privacy guarantees, especially in the Fourth 
Amendment,101 which protects individuals against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The case law of the US Supreme Court (‘Supreme Court’) developed 
certain standards of constitutional protection of privacy, which are, however, 
very ambivalent. The courts have also developed a common law right to privacy, 
including a right to be left alone, allowing suits for damages and injunctions 
through a private cause of action. Private law protection of privacy is relatively 
weak because freedom of speech, the value with which privacy is often in 
conflict, enjoys a high degree of constitutional protection in the First 
Amendment. 
In federal data protection legislation, the Privacy Act 1974 (‘Privacy Act’) is 
of particular note.102 It imposes standards that bind a federal agency in its 
collection, use, maintenance and disclosure of personally identifiable 
information. It creates statutory privacy rights for US citizens and legal 
permanent residents but does not cover visitors or aliens. Non-US persons can 
nonetheless benefit from the protections of the Privacy Act, when agencies, such 
as the US Department of Homeland Security, apply its provisions to data 
repositories that contain personal information of US persons and non-US 
persons.103 A further limitation of the Privacy Act is that it does not apply to 
records created or held by the intelligence agencies. As a result many new 
surveillance possibilities established for anti-terrorism purposes stand outside or 
displace the Privacy Act.104 
The most relevant restriction on surveillance is the Fourth Amendment to the 
US Constitution. In the landmark decision of Katz v United States,105 the Supreme 
Court provided some protection for individual privacy against state surveillance, 
but the judgment did not lead to the development of broadly-based privacy 
jurisprudence.106 The Supreme Court held that the government intrudes upon a 
person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, and violates an individual’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment, if it overhears that person’s private conversations 
by means of a listening device attached to the outside of a public phone booth. 
Yet, subsequent case law demonstrates that the protection under the Fourth 
Amendment is incomplete in an important respect: any personal information, 
                                                
101  Stephen J Schulhofer, More Essential Than Ever: The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) 144–68. 
102  5 USC § 552a. See Andrew Charlesworth, ‘Clash of the Data Titans? US and EU Data Privacy 
Regulation’ (2000) 6 European Public Law 253, 259–60. 
103  Hugo Teufel III, ‘Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum’ (Memorandum No 2007-1, US Department of 
Homeland Security, 7 January 2009) <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policy 
guide_2007-1.pdf>. 
104  If a specific Act on the use of personal data authorises this use (like FISA), the Privacy Act does not 
apply. 
105  Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967) (‘Katz’).  
106  See Thomas N McInnis, The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment (Lexington Books, 2009) 222–9. 
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which a person voluntarily communicates to a third party, such as to a bank (in 
United States v Miller)107 or a telephone company (in Smith v Maryland)108 no 
longer enjoys the protection of the Fourth Amendment.109 These dicta import a 
significant limitation to privacy. Once a person is communicating personal data 
to someone else (including private business or individuals) the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment no longer applies. This provided the basis for section 215 of 
FISA, introduced through the Patriot Act, that empowers the FISC to issues 
orders on third parties to turn over information records that may assist 
investigations against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. 
While these various strands of constitutional, statute and case law create a 
patchwork of privacy protection, they constantly need to be adapted in light of 
technological developments that create new threats to privacy. In United States v 
Jones,110 the Supreme Court recently decided on the reach of Fourth Amendment 
in the context of new tracking technologies. Jones was a suspected drug dealer 
and the police decided to attach a Global Positioning System (‘GPS’) tracking 
tool to his car, while it was parked in a public place. The Supreme Court found 
that this police conduct constituted an unconstitutional ‘search’ of the car, and 
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Instead of using the Katz test, the 
decision was based on a property-based conception of Fourth Amendment rights 
and held that the police had committed a trespass on the car. In their opinions, the 
Justices also put into doubt the principle that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to a third party.111 
But, for now, the extent to which this newer jurisprudence affects the 
longstanding decisions in Miller and Smith remains unclear. 
In the very recent case of Riley v California,112 the US Supreme Court 
recognised the significance of mobile phones as repositories of personal 
information and held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the search of a 
cellphone without a warrant. Together with Jones, this decision shows the US 
Supreme Court’s willingness to keep the privacy protections provided for in the 
US Constitution relevant to the contemporary technological context. 
 
3 Conclusion 
The US has dramatically extended its national and international surveillance 
activities since 9/11. The US administrative and extra-legal approach made it 
                                                
107  United States v Miller, 425 US 435 (1976) (‘Miller’). 
108  Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979). 
109  McInnis, above n 106, 232–8. 
110  United States v Jones, 132 S Ct 945 (2012) (‘Jones’). 
111  See especially ibid 957 (Sotomayor J), 962–3 (Alito J). See also Federico Fabbrini and Mathias 
Vermeulen, ‘GPS Surveillance and Human Rights Review: The European Court of Human Rights and the 
United States Supreme Court in Comparative Perspective’ in Fergal Davis, Nicola McGarrity and George 
Williams (eds), Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2014) 
134, 139–48. 
112  Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473 (2014). 
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possible to sidestep some of the constitutional restrictions that traditionally 
limited surveillance. The national and international criticism following the 
Snowden revelations of the largely unbridled development of US surveillance 
activities may now prompt a re-evaluation of some aspects of these activities. In 
January 2014, President Obama delivered a major speech calling for reforms to 
government surveillance programs, including those conducted by the NSA, to 
strengthen protections for privacy and civil liberties, improving transparency and 
oversight, and to rebuild trust among foreign leaders and citizens.113 The US 
Congress has begun to exercise closer scrutiny and to implement law reform 
proposals that would improve privacy protections, including restraints on extra-
legal surveillance as a counter-terrorism measure.114  
Surveillance activities appear to be less extensive in relation to US citizens 
but some counter-terrorism measures are unable to differentiate according to 
citizenship or residence. In such cases, the Supreme Court may be called upon by 
US persons to develop the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment further.115 
Despite some newer developments, the protection of privacy regarding counter-
terrorism activities faces many restrictions. Regarding the monitoring of US 
citizens, it will be the task of the Supreme Court to adapt the existing restraints, 
in particular the Fourth Amendment, to provide redress against new threats of 
undue government interference. 
International surveillance by US agencies falls altogether outside US privacy 
protection. First of all, neither the US Constitution nor the US Privacy Act 
protects foreigners living abroad. International agreements between the US and 
the EU with regard to Passenger Name Records (‘PNR’), which have established 
a particular regime of data protection, and a proposed data protection agreement 
relating to personal data shared with the US by EU countries for law enforcement 
purposes remain the exception. In the course of negotiations relating to this 
agreement, the US administration recently declared the intention to extend the 
protection guaranteed by the US Privacy Act to EU citizens.116 Such an extension, 
however, would not affect the large-scale surveillance and collection activities by 
US intelligence agencies which will remain virtually beyond challenge by non-
US citizens. 
 
                                                
113  Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’ (Speech delivered at the 
Department of Justice, Washington DC, 17 January 2014) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence>. See also Richard A Clarke et al, ‘Liberty and 
Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies’ (Final Report, Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communication Technologies, 12 December 2013) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ 
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114  See, eg, the current USA Freedom Act initiative before Congress. 
115  Cole, above n 19, 95–116. 
116  See Ewen MacAskill, ‘US to Extend Privacy Protection Rights to EU Citizens’, The Guardian (online), 
25 June 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/25/us-privacy-protection-rights-europe>.  
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C    Australia 
1 Counter-Terrorism Surveillance Measures 
While Australia has not suffered devastating terrorist attacks in its own 
territory,117 the Australian Parliament established a wide spectrum of far-reaching 
counter-terrorism measures after 9/11. Politically inspired by counter-terrorism 
legislation in the US and the UK, Australia’s ‘hyper-legislation’118 has created 
new anti-terrorism offences and provided the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (‘ASIO’) and other agencies with myriad new powers.119 These 
developments need to be assessed in the context of Australia’s system for 
protection of human rights, which now stands unique among Western 
democracies. The absence of a constitutional Bill of Rights at the federal level 
means that the High Court has few powers to invalidate excessive anti-terrorism 
laws. Instead, it is the Australian Parliament that has primary responsibility for 
balancing and upholding human rights. Under Australia’s bicameral 
parliamentary system, the chances of effective scrutiny of legislation often 
depend on the Senate, representing the Australian states and territories, with such 
scrutiny being more likely when the Senate is not controlled by the party forming 
the Commonwealth government. However, much of Australia’s anti-terrorism 
legislation has been bipartisan and rushed through Parliament in a climate of fear 
and urgency,120 as a result of which Senate amendments of Bills are often focused 
on specific issues rather than the overall trend and effect of the legislation. 
The academic debate on counter-terrorism measures seems to have focused 
on the new offences and the expansion of coercive powers, such as questioning 
and detention powers, given to ASIO and other law enforcement agencies.121  
The extent to which the surveillance powers and capabilities have been  
enhanced has received much less attention.122 This is despite the fact that the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (‘TIA’) has  
been amended numerous times since 2001. The TIA regulates the  
circumstances in which communications – both communications passing over a 
telecommunications network as well as stored communications – can be accessed 
by law enforcement agencies.123 In his detailed analysis ‘A Decade of Australian 
                                                
117  The Bali Bombings of 12 October 2002 were, however, a major turning point in Australia’s efforts to 
foster regional cooperation on counter-terrorism. 
118  This term is used as the title of the chapter on Australia in Roach, above n 1, 309–60. 
119  See Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, ‘From Covert to Coercive: A New Model of Surveillance by 
Intelligence Agencies’ in Fergal Davis, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams (eds), Surveillance, 
Counter-Terrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2014) 234.  
120  See Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, ‘Counter-Terrorism Laws in a Nation without a Bill of 
Rights: The Australian Experience’ (2010) 2 City University of Hong Kong Law Review 45.  
121  See Roach, above n 1. 
122  But see Niloufer Selvadurai, Peter Gillies and Rizwanul Islam, ‘Maintaining an Effective Legislative 
Framework for Telecommunication Interception in Australia’ (2009) 33 Criminal Law Journal 34; Simon 
Bronitt and James Stellios, ‘Telecommunications Interception in Australia: Recent Trends and Regulatory 
Prospects’ (2005) 29 Telecommunications Policy 875. 
123  A communication is a conversation or a message in whatever form, including speech or data: TIA s 5. 
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Anti-terror Laws’, George Williams dedicates only one paragraph to surveillance 
measures: 
Section 5D of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) 
includes divs 72, 101, 102 and 103 of the Criminal Code within the definition of a 
‘serious offence’. This means that telecommunications warrants may be issued to 
assist with the investigation of terrorism offences. Warrants may also be issued in 
relation to non-suspects who are ‘likely to communicate’ with the person under 
investigation (known as ‘B-Party’ communication). Communications may be 
intercepted through intrusive methods such as optical surveillance and tracking 
devices.124 
The TIA also provides a statutory basis for warrantless access to 
telecommunications data. Under Part IV, telecommunications providers are 
obliged to hand over communications metadata (not the content of the 
communications) to numerous Commonwealth and state government 
departments and agencies if the information is ‘reasonably necessary’ for a law 
enforcement purpose and the disclosure is approved by an authorised senior 
officer of the relevant agency. In the year 2012–13, 319 874 authorisations for 
access to existing information or documents were made in the enforcement of a 
criminal law alone.125 As a result of the Telecommunications Interception and 
Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) (‘TIISLA’), the 
communication and sharing of intelligence between intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies has been further enhanced.126 Greg Carne summarises the 
consequences of TIISLA as follows: 
[T]he changes provide security and intelligence agencies with a significantly 
enhanced influence or contribution, through communication, cooperation and 
assistance, into Commonwealth and State administration. Largely by a legislative 
process of ignorance, default, omission and elision, the Telecommunications 
Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth) 
signals a strong move towards a more authoritative state, with the infusion and 
integration of national security information, cooperation and assistance as 
increasingly influential in the ordinary business and functions of both 
Commonwealth and State government.127 
In a 2012 discussion paper, the Attorney-General’s Department 
acknowledged that the telecommunications interception regime is outdated and in 
need of ‘holistic reform’.128 The Attorney-General Department’s proposals were 
                                                
124  See George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-terror Laws’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law 
Review 1136, 1150–1; see also David Hume and George Williams, ‘Who’s Listening? Intercepting the 
Telephone Calls, Emails and SMS’s of Innocent People’ (2006) 31 Alternative Law Journal 211; see also 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) s 6.  
125  Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979: Annual 
Report 2012–13’ (Report, 2013) 49. 
126  Greg Carne, ‘Beyond Terrorism: Enlarging the National Security Footprint through the 
Telecommunication Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth)’ 
(2011) 13 Flinders Law Journal 177. 
127  Ibid 239. 
128  Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Equipping Australia against Emerging and Evolving Threats’ 
(Discussion Paper, July 2012) 17. 
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said to aim at strengthening the safeguards and privacy protections; reforming the 
lawful access regime for agencies; reducing complexity and modernising the 
cost-sharing framework.129 In June 2013, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security tabled a report that assessed potential reform options in 
the context of a wider inquiry into the legislative national security framework, 
including the TIA, the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) and the Intelligence Services 
Act 2001 (Cth).130 As far as the TIA was concerned, the report recommended the 
introduction of an objects clause which would express the Act’s dual objectives 
of protecting the privacy of communications and of enabling interception and 
access to communications in order to investigate serious crime and threats to 
national security. 131  In addition to mandatory record keeping standards and 
improved oversight arrangements, the report also recommended that the 
Attorney-General’s Department examine the introduction of a proportionality test 
into the legislation that would provide a mechanism for balancing the privacy 
interest affected, the public interest in the investigative activity and the 
availability of less invasive investigative measures.132 
In December 2013, the Senate referred an inquiry into a comprehensive 
revision of the TIA, including the recommendations of the 2013 Report of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, to its Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee. 133  While this inquiry is still 
underway,134 the government has introduced a Bill to implement the (bipartisan) 
recommendations of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security to expand the surveillance capabilities of the Australian spy agencies.135 
Under these proposed amendments, ASIO will be given wide-ranging new 
powers to use computers of innocent third parties to gain access to a computer 
used by a suspected terrorist or criminal. Through a redefinition of the term 
‘computer’, 136  ASIO will also be empowered to access multiple computers 
operating in a network on a single warrant, rather than requiring separate 
warrants for individual computers as at present – widening its capabilities to 
target information stored in the cloud or to intercept information flows between 
computers. In implementing these proposals, the government is heeding the calls 
                                                
129  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No 218 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security, Inquiry into Potential Reforms of National Security Legislation, 2–3. 
130  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Report of the 
Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia's National Security Legislation (2013).  
131  Ibid recommendation 1. 
132  Ibid recommendation 2. 
133  Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Comprehensive 
Revision of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (2014) <http://www.aph.gov.au/ 
Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Comprehensive_revision
_of_TIA_Act>. 
134  The Committee is due to report in August 2014. 
135  See National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014 (Cth). 
136  National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014 (Cth) cl 3, sch 2 pt 1 item 4. 
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of the Australian Intelligence Community137 that increased powers are needed to 
effectively combat the threat of terrorism, including from Australians who are 
suspected of engaging in overseas terrorist activities. In light of the bipartisan 
support for increasing the powers of the intelligence services, these changes are 
certain to pass Parliament, and Australians must accept the government’s 
assurances that the exercise of these new powers will be ‘subject to appropriate 
safeguards and accountability mechanisms’.138 Yet, this further expansion of 
surveillance powers will add to the sense of public unease about the reach of the 
Australian intelligence agencies into the lives of ordinary Australian citizens.139 
 
2 Privacy and Counter-Terrorism 
Australian data protection laws are mainly contained in the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth) (‘Privacy Act’), which responds, as stated in its preamble, both to 
Australia’s obligations to protect privacy under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights as well as to the OECD Guidelines on Privacy. The 
Privacy Act applies to federal agencies as well as private sector organisations. In 
the Privacy Act, the term ‘agency’ includes the ‘Australian Federal Police’ 
(section 6(1)) and other Commonwealth bodies. However, section 7(1) provides 
that an act or practice ‘in relation to a record that has originated with, or has been 
received from … an intelligence agency’140 is not subject to the Privacy Act. 
Furthermore, section 7(1A) specifies that the disclosure of personal information 
by another entity to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service or the Australian Signals Directorate is not 
an act or practice which falls under the Privacy Act. Disclosure and other data 
processing in the context of national security is therefore intended to be exempt 
from the general protections of privacy. Counter-terrorism measures are only 
relevant within the privacy framework if they are part of law enforcement. 
                                                
137  The ‘Australian Intelligence Community’ is an informal term to describe the six Australian security and 
intelligence agencies: Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, The Australian Intelligence 
Community, <http://www.igis.gov.au/aic/>. 
138  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, above n 130, recommendation 22. Many of 
the safeguards in the current legislation only apply to ‘Australian persons’, ie Australian citizens and 
permanent residents, providing more far-ranging powers to act against non-Australians: see, eg, 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) ss 8, 9, 15.  
139  As part of the extensive revelations in 2013 of secret surveillance activities by the US and its close allies, 
a secret document leaked by Edward Snowden suggested that the Australian Defence Signals Directorate 
(now the Australian Signals Directorate) offered to share private information on Australian citizens to its 
four intelligence-sharing partners: Ewen MacAskill, James Ball and Katharine Murphy, ‘Revealed: 
Australian Spy Agency Offered to Share Data about Ordinary Citizens’, The Guardian (online), 2 
December 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/revealed-australian-spy-agency-
offered-to-share-data-about-ordinary-citizens>.  
140  These are defined in s 6 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) as ‘(a) the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation; (b) the Australian Secret Intelligence Service; or (c) the Office of National Assessments.’ 
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The Privacy Act has recently been amended to reflect changes in modern 
information practices.141 Under the revised Act, ‘APP entities’, which includes 
the public sector agencies and private sector organisations to which the Privacy 
Act applies, must handle personal information in conformity with the ‘Australian 
Privacy Principles’ (‘APPs’). The APPs lay down standards relating to the 
collection, use, disclosure and storage of personal information. However, 
‘enforcement related activities’ of ‘enforcement bodies’ are facilitated through a 
number of exceptions in the principles.142 This includes that enforcement bodies 
may collect sensitive information without the consent of the individual concerned 
(APP 3.4) and that an APP entity may use or disclose personal information for a 
purpose other than the purpose for which it was collected (secondary purpose) if 
it reasonably believes this to be necessary for ‘enforcement related activities 
conducted by, or on behalf of, an enforcement body’ (APP 6.2(e)). APP 8, which 
imposes limitations on cross-border disclosure of personal information, also does 
not apply to an agency if the cross-border disclosure is ‘required or authorised by 
or under an international agreement relating to information sharing to which 
Australia is a party’ (APP 8.2(e)). This would include, for example, the UKUSA 
Agreement. Another exception applies if an agency reasonably believes the 
disclosure to be necessary for enforcement related activities by an overseas body 
with similar functions or powers to an Australian enforcement body (APP 8.2(f)). 
This exception potentially applies to all kinds of information exchanges for the 
purposes of counter-terrorism between Commonwealth agencies and overseas 
law enforcement bodies. In these cases, Australian agencies are not bound to 
respect the APPs. 
 
3 Conclusion 
Australians lack a constitutional right to privacy and the data protection 
provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) contain significant holes. The activities 
of the intelligence agencies are not subject to the Act and exceptions to the APPs 
give law enforcement agencies relatively free reign in designing their information 
handling practices as well as easier access to information held by other agencies. 
                                                
141  For a general overview of the reforms, see Normann Witzleb, ‘Halfway or Half-Hearted? An Overview of 
the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth)’ (2013) 41 Australian Business 
Law Review 55. 
142  ‘Enforcement related activities’ and ‘enforcement bodies’ are terms defined in s 6 of the Privacy Act 
1988 (Cth). Enforcement related activities include ‘(a) the prevention, detection, investigation, 
prosecution or punishment of: (i) criminal offences; or (ii) breaches of a law imposing a penalty or 
sanction; or (b) the conduct of surveillance activities, intelligence gathering activities or monitoring 
activities’. Enforcement bodies include the Australian Federal Police, state and territory police forces, 
CrimTrac (the national police information sharing body). The Australian Secret Intelligence Service are 
not specifically mentioned under s 6. However, they could be considered to be falling under ‘(f) another 
agency, to the extent that it is responsible for administering, or performing a function under, a law that 
imposes a penalty or sanction or a prescribed law’. This would be on the basis that they ‘may co-operate 
with and [assist law enforcement bodies] in the performance of [their functions]’: see, eg, Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 19(1).  
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The powers provided under ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) and the TIA have been 
significantly extended since 2001 and are due for further expansion under 
legislative proposals recently introduced by the federal Government. Intelligence 
agencies and police authorities have increased their cooperation,143 blurring the 
distinction between intelligence-gathering and law enforcement.144 The recent 
reforms of the Privacy Act, including the introduction of revised Privacy 
Principles, have not substantially changed Australia’s surveillance situation. 
There is widespread recognition that the TIA, which provides the basis for access 
to and interception of telecommunications data, is outdated and provides 
insufficient protection of individual privacy. The proposed reforms will widen 
the surveillance capabilities of Australia’s security agencies and are intended to 
provide a more coherent set of safeguards and accountability mechanisms. 
The Australian public knows little about the extent to which counter-
terrorism measures allow surveillance and cross-border information sharing by 
Australian government agencies. It is therefore unsurprising that there is growing 
unease about the extent to which Australian intelligence agencies and law 
enforcement authorities engage in surveillance of ordinary citizens. The recent 
Snowden revelations about vast secret surveillance programs in the US, and 
embarrassing revelations of Australia targeting the inner circle of the Indonesian 
government,145 suggest that improved technical capabilities need to be matched 
with more robust protocols on permitted usage. The absence of constitutional 
protections of the right to privacy and relatively weak data protection laws 
provide government with much discretion to expand the powers of agencies to 
encroach on the personal information of Australian citizens. 
 
III    INTERNET SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY AND 
INTERNATIONAL DATA PROTECTION 
A    The New Dimension of Intrusion 
Surveillance measures for the purposes of counter-terrorism are reaching 
unprecedented intensity and intrude deeply into the personal sphere of millions of 
citizens. Because of the globalisation of telecommunications, every person can 
become a potential target of monitoring and information exchanges by almost 
any state of the world, often without personal knowledge. While citizens may 
enjoy some (constitutional) protections of their right to privacy against their own 
state, non-citizens may often find it impossible to resist these practices. 
                                                
143  See Telecommunications Interception and Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth).  
144  Carne, above n 126, 186–93. 
145  Ewen MacAskill and Lenore Taylor, ‘Australia's Spy Agencies Targeted Indonesian President's Mobile 
Phone’, The Guardian (online), 18 November 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/ 
australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone>. 
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Besides its international dimension, internet surveillance often includes the 
following characteristics. First of all, surveillance powers are usually not 
restricted to terrorism. Although terrorist attacks were, and still are, in many 
cases the primary political reason for introducing new surveillance measures, 
they have been given a much broader field of application that will, as a 
minimum, extend to law enforcement against (trans)national serious or organised 
crime. Data collection is increasingly in bulk and not limited to a strict purpose; 
and the hurdles in the way of sharing analysed data with other agencies are being 
whittled away. Thus, law enforcement is increasingly led by intelligence, and 
intelligence agencies are contributing to law enforcement. 
Second, intrusion is also more encompassing because modern technologies 
allow monitoring of the whole or significant sections of society. Surveillance is 
no longer dependent on suspicion of criminal (or terrorist) behaviour. Societies 
under surveillance lose freedom. If surveillance is covert and the use of the data 
obtained remains unknown, all but the most oblivious will act on the assumption 
that their behaviour is observed and that, at some point in the future, the results 
of surveillance may be used against them.146 
A third dimension of the new intrusion is its permanence. There is no 
prospect that the current level of surveillance will be scaled back. Counter-
terrorism provides the basis for preventive measures without the existence of a 
concrete danger. As the potential of a terrorist threat always exists and the list of 
terrorist attacks is getting longer (from 9/11 to Bali, and Madrid to London, from 
Boston to the next terrorist attack), the move towards surveillance seems 
irreversible. Technological advances make data storage and data retention ever 
cheaper, adding a further dimension of permanence. Even where the erasure of 
data is provided for, there is no reason for confidence that deletion really occurs 
or that, accidentally and deliberately, data will not be retained and, once it is 
retained, that it will not be accessed for some future use.147 
Finally, the spectre of total surveillance no longer appears impossible 
because technology provides ever-expanding potential for data sharing, data 
matching and data meshing. Data processors can be public or private, and the 
state increasingly coopts private business into its surveillance agenda. Anyone 
with whom we communicate, or whose infrastructure we use, can be turned into 
a potential contributor to state surveillance. Information resulting from internet 
surveillance can be combined with personal information held by private 
enterprises,148 such as bank accounts, travel itineraries, social networks, or with 
data held in government repositories of tax, social security and other state-held 
                                                
146  Cate, above n 10, 477–9. 
147  On the need for erasure, see Victor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital 
Age (Princeton University Press, 2011).  
148  Pell, above n 92. 
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information.149 Personal movements can be tracked through a combination of 
video surveillance 150  and geolocation data. 151  This increase in surveillance 
possibilities is further expanded by advances in analysing capabilities of personal 
information.152 Big data applications raise the prospect of mining information to 
predict future behaviour or psychological preferences of which a target person 
might not even be aware.153 
The new dimension of international surveillance networks potentially 
includes everybody and leads to a permanent and dramatically accelerating loss 
of privacy. These surveillance networks target as many different aspects of 
human behaviour as possible and seek to use ever-improving tools of analysis. 
The data collected by these networks is subject to exponential growth, as more 
information is gained, analytical tools are improving and the storage capacities 
are expanding. The anti-terrorism narrative, on which these programs are often 
based, tends to make them politically immune. However, a constitutional 
response to this form of counter-terrorism measure needs to reassert the value 
and possibilities of protection of privacy and personal data. 
 
B    The International Privacy Challenge 
Victor V Ramraj argues that a ‘global perspective [of anti-terrorism laws] 
enriches our understanding of law and is imperative in the formulation of 
sophisticated and effective policies’ yet requires a ‘nuanced and sophisticated 
approach, one that is mindful of local differences and particularities that 
transform the way legal norms are understood, articulated, implemented and 
resisted in different parts of the world.’154 This insight does not only apply to 
counter-terrorism measures, which reflect the history, politics and (constitutional) 
law of a society, but equally to an evaluation of the need for privacy. 
The difficulty for privacy advocates is that there is no universally  
shared understanding of privacy. Different legal cultures and jurisdictions  
have adopted different approaches to privacy and data protection, each  
                                                
149  Calling for greater sensitivity towards data held by public authorities, see Cecilia Magnusson Sjöberg, 
‘Administrative Data Protection in Global Networks’ in Anna-Sara Lind and Jane Reichel (eds), 
Administrative Law beyond the State: Nordic Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Liber AB, 2013) 
143–61. 
150  See Mathias Klang, ‘Privacy, Surveillance and Identity’ in Mathias Klang and Andrew Murray (eds), 
Human Rights in the Digital Age (Cavendish Publishing, 2005) 175–89. 
151  See Fabbrini and Vermeulen, above n 111.  
152  See Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, above n 11.  
153  See Omer Tene, ‘Privacy: The New Generations’ (2011) 1 International Data Privacy Law 15, who is 
arguing for a new generation of governance beyond the private/public and the personal/non-personal data 
dichotomy. 
154  Victor V Ramraj, ‘The Impossibility of Global Anti-terrorism Law?’ in Victor V Ramraj et al (eds), 
Global Anti-terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 66.  
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reflecting their unique historical, political and legal development. 155  While  
the EU follows a constitutional and rights-based approach with highly  
specific legislative requirements,156 Australia relies solely on statutory protections  
without constitutional reinforcement or a rights-based framework. The US  
approach includes elements of the two extreme positions.157 It relies on a strong 
constitutional framework which focuses on the protection of privacy against the 
state and a patchwork of norms to protect privacy in private and business 
relationships. However, in a globalised world of communication and 
informational networks that are subject to transnational surveillance measures, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to rely on purely domestic notions, and national 
protections, of privacy.158  
In the wake of 9/11, and following the lead of the US, Western democracies 
around the globe massively expanded the powers of law enforcement and 
national security agencies, without creating sufficient oversight to control the use 
of these powers. If we take a closer look at the conflict between privacy and 
counter-terrorism, national security and intelligence agencies measures, the EU 
(for reasons of competences), the US (for reasons of wide executive powers) and 
Australia (for lacking an effective human rights framework) are essentially not 
all that different. The data privacy obligations of intelligence agencies are not 
properly addressed in any of the three legal orders. 
The exemptions in general data protections laws are far-reaching and impose 
few obstacles to privacy-invasive practices. In the EU, each member state retains 
the power to define the powers of its intelligence agencies and how these 
agencies are controlled. In many countries, including Germany, Australia and the 
US, parliamentary control of intelligence agencies plays an important role even 
though it is, in practice, often lacking in effectiveness. In the US, the 
Congressional response to the Snowden revelations will be crucial; the extension 
of Fourth Amendment protections by the courts remains another possibility to 
foster data privacy. Only jurisdictions with privacy clauses, be they express or 
implied, in their constitutions or bills of rights subscribe to the idea that there are 
absolute limits beyond which state intrusion into personal privacy is prohibited. 
The CJEU judgment on the Data Retention Directive provides EU lawmakers 
with guidance on these limits. In the US, Congress will determine the future 
legislative framework for national intelligence services, while the US Supreme 
Court will have the responsibility to provide judicial protection against undue 
                                                
155  See, eg, regarding US, Germany, France, Australia, South Korea, Hong Kong and Hungary: James B 
Rule and Graham Greenleaf (eds), Global Privacy Protection: The First Generation (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2008).  
156  Despite this European overlay, there remain significant constitutional and cultural differences between 
the various European countries.  
157  For a very illuminating discussion on the differences between the continental European and the US 
approach: James Q Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 
Yale Law Journal 1151.  
158  See Bernhard Maier, ‘How Has the Law Attempted to Tackle the Borderless Nature of the Internet?’ 
(2010) 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 142, 156–63, 174–5. 
2014 Thematic: The Challenge to Privacy 777 
interferences. In Australia, the courts only have very limited powers to invalidate 
certain forms of surveillance if they are in compliance with enacted legislation. 
The cooperation of law enforcement and national security agencies with 
regard to counter-terrorism deserves particular attention. The EU developed 
certain privacy standards regarding police cooperation and Europol but retained 
many exemptions in the current Draft Directive. The Australian TIA, as well as 
planned reforms to this statute, opened up the possibilities for further and 
cooperative surveillance measures between law enforcement authorities and 
intelligence agencies. The US has traditionally limited the possibilities of law 
enforcement authorities regarding the intrusion in the private sphere and there are 
some signs that the surveillance program affecting US citizens will be reviewed, 
but surveillance of non-US persons continues virtually unabated. 
This short comparative overview provided some insight into the diverse 
understandings of privacy and data protection in different constitutional 
systems.159 It demonstrated that constitutional systems face significant challenges 
in establishing a framework that appropriately balances the interest in public 
safety and freedom from terrorism with the legitimate expectations of ordinary 
citizens that their privacy will be respected. 
 
C    A Charter for Data Protection Rights:  
Approaches toward International Data Protection 
Simon Chesterman proposes in his book ‘One Nation under Surveillance’ 
that the establishment of a new social contract has become necessary in 
surveillance societies.160  It is certainly true that the relations between state, 
society and the individual have to be renegotiated in this new era of almost 
limitless gathering of private information. However, to be effective, such a 
compact needs to take account of the international dimension of surveillance and 
societies. Societies are no longer built within one nation, one state, one 
constitution. Globalisation, and especially the internet, 161  has created global 
communities and the need to consider regulation in transnational, even virtual 
dimensions. 162  The proper balancing of counter-terrorism, including state 
surveillance, with privacy can benefit from comparative constitutionalism but 
                                                
159  Stephanie Schiedermair, ‘Data Protection – Is There a Bridge across the Atlantic?’ in Dieter Dörr and 
Russell L Weaver (eds), The Right to Privacy in the Light of Media Convergence: Perspectives from 
Three Continents (De Gruyter, 2012) 357; see also Lee A Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International 
Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2014); David Lindsay, ‘An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of 
Privacy and the Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University 
Law Review 131, 169.  
160  Simon Chesterman, One Nation under Surveillance: A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom Without 
Sacrificing Liberty (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
161  On the forms of state regulation of the internet, see Maier, above n 158, 170–3.  
162  Konrad Lachmayer, ‘Constitutional Reasoning as Legitimacy of Constitutional Comparison’ (2013) 14 
German Law Journal 1463, 1471, 1479–80, 1487.  
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needs to bear in mind the fragmented structure of international (constitutional) 
law.163 
The new global challenges to privacy, which have far-reaching consequences 
for communities as well as individuals, can no longer solely be solved at a 
national level. Despite recent efforts of regulators to enhance the coordination  
of their enforcement activities,164 domestic data protections laws and national 
regulators appear increasingly ill-equipped to deal with the international 
dimension of state surveillance and massive cross-border sharing of personal 
data. The cross-border dimension of modern surveillance, and its justification 
with national security imperatives, also make it virtually impossible for 
individuals to challenge covert and firmly entrenched programs of state 
surveillance.165 It is likely that real change can only be affected at an international 
level through negotiation between states who act to defend their citizens’ privacy 
as a matter of national sovereignty. 
There are already some examples of international cooperation and 
agreements relating to the exchange of personal data. The US and Europe have 
entered into the TFTP Agreement166  and the PNR Agreement;167 the EU and 
Australia also have a PNR Agreement;168 and Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
the UK and the US are parties to the UKUSA Agreement.169 These agreements 
illustrate that countries or regions can reach agreements on information sharing 
arrangements in specific contexts, without the need to surrender their own 
understanding of privacy and data protection to the interests of another. These 
measures coincide with a rise in the number of other international initiatives with 
regard to privacy and data protection.170 
It is, however, a much more challenging undertaking to find common ground 
on general standards of privacy protection, rather than on specific issues, and to 
                                                
163  Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
164  ‘Resolution on International Enforcement Coordination’ (Resolution adopted at 35th International 
Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Warsaw, 23–26 September 2013). 
165  Global civil society plays an important role in addressing security issues, see Ian Loader and Neil Walker, 
Civilizing Security (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 254–6. For a domestic (Canadian) example of 
social response, see Vanessa MacDonnell, ‘Internet Surveillance and Popular Constitutionalism’ in Fergal 
Davis, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams (eds), Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and Comparative 
Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2014) 313. 
166  Terrorist Finance Tracking Program Agreement [2010] OJ L 195/5. The US and the EU are also 
currently engaged in negotiations towards an umbrella agreement to govern data exchange for law 
enforcement purposes: see Viviane Reding, EU-US Justice Ministerial in Athens: Vice-President Reding 
Welcomes US Announcement on Data Protection Umbrella Agreement (25 June 2014) European 
Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/multimedia/news/2014/06/ 
20140625_en.htm>. 
167  TFTP Agreement [2012] OJ L 215/5. 
168  PNR Agreement [2012] OJ L 186/4. 
169  UK Government, Newly Released GCHQ Files: UKUSA Agreement (June 2010) The National Archives 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukusa/>. 
170  See Kuner, above n 12. 
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do so not in bi- or multilateral agreements but on a truly global scale.171 
Considering the widely diverging approaches to privacy rights among liberal 
Western democracies, as demonstrated by the EU, Australia and the US, the 
chances of finding a global consensus on privacy seem remote.172 There is, 
however, scope for privacy issues to be considered in the context of international 
agreements on online security or internet governance, which usually rank more 
highly in the policy agendas of governments.173 
It is unlikely that the EU initiatives to establish a new data protection 
framework could serve as a global blueprint. While the Union aims to export its 
ideas and concept of data protection, the new Draft Framework is perceived 
internationally as complex and burdensome. The demand for an adequate level of 
protection in countries to which data should be exported can operate as a lever to 
raise the levels of domestic data protection in other countries. However, if the 
limited success of the current adequacy framework in article 29 of the EU Data 
Protection Directive is a guide to the future, it must be doubted that the EU will 
successfully export its high standards of data protection to other countries around 
the world.174 
A more likely candidate for global privacy standards is the Council of Europe 
(COE)’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (‘Convention 108’). Dating from 1981, Convention 
108 is ratified by nearly all of the member states of the Council of Europe (with 
the significant exception of Turkey) but non-European countries are also able to 
accede. As the first non-European country, Uruguay recently ratified Convention 
108. 175  A process of modernisation currently underway is likely to make 
Convention 108 more attractive to countries seeking to demonstrate their 
commitment to meeting global privacy standards.176 Convention 108, however, 
offers two important exceptions. First, article 3 paragraph 2 of Convention 108 
gives a member state the possibility to declare ‘that it will not apply this 
convention to certain categories of automated personal data files’. Such 
declarations with regard to national or state security were made by a number of 
countries, including Ireland, Latvia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Malta and 
                                                
171  See Bygrave, above n 159; Gunasekara, above n 96, 176–8. 
172  See, eg, with regard to other countries, Graham Greenleaf, ‘Promises and Illusions of Data Protection in 
Indian Law’ (2011) 1 International Data Privacy Law 47; Mario Viola de Azevedo Cunha and Danilo 
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Challenges to Regulation (Ashgate Publishing, 2013) 217–28. 
173  See Clarke et al, above n 113, in particular recommendations 31 and 33. 
174  For a critical analysis of the EU’s approaches, see Lingjie Kong, ‘Data Protection and Transborder Data 
Flow in the European and Global Context’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 441, 444–6. 
175  See Graham Greenleaf, ‘The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards outside Europe: Implications 
for Globalisation of Convention 108?’ (2012) 2 International Data Privacy Law 68, 81–91. 
176  For further discussion, see Graham Greenleaf, ‘A World Data Privacy Treaty? “Globalisation” and 
“Modernisation” of Council of Europe Convention 108’ in Normann Witzleb et al (eds), Emerging 
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Romania. Furthermore, article 9 of Convention 108 allows derogation from the 
core provisions of Convention 108 ‘when such derogation is provided for by the 
law of the Party and constitutes a necessary measure in a democratic society in 
the interests of […] protecting State security, public safety, the monetary 
interests of the State or the suppression of criminal offences’.177 This exemption 
of article 9, however, requires proportionality. Although the existing Convention 
108 thus provides significant scope for exempting state surveillance for counter-
terrorism, it has established itself as an important repository of general 
international data protection standards. The current process of modernisation and 
review of Convention 108 is likely to enhance these standards and broaden their 
application.178 This makes it likely that Convention 108 will remain a more likely 
model for non-COE members to follow than the highly technical and more 
demanding provisions of the proposed new EU Data Protection Framework. 
Another important international treaty arising from the Council of Europe in 
the field of counter-terrorism is the Convention on Cybercrime (‘Convention 
185’). Convention 185 has been ratified by most European countries,179 but also 
by a number of non-COE countries including Australia, Japan, Panama and the 
US. Apart from providing for the penalisation of computer-related offences, 
which become increasingly relevant in the context of counter-terrorism, 
Convention 185 seeks to establish common procedural standards to fight 
cybercrime, including for example, in relation to ‘Search and Seizure of Stored 
Computer Data’ (article 19), ‘Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data’ (article 20) 
or the ‘Interception of Content Data’ (article 21). Lastly Convention 185 creates a 
legal framework for international cooperation and mutual assistance for the 
purposes of the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. Such measures will 
often involve the sharing of personal information, yet Convention 185 does not 
provide any specific data protection standards that need to be observed in 
cooperation and mutual assistance matters.180 It is therefore of limited use with 
regards to establishing the appropriate balance between law enforcement and data 
protection.181 
                                                
177  Russia explicitly makes use of the derogation possibility of article 9 of Convention 108 (Russian 
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Further international data privacy instruments or declarations like the OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data,182 the APEC Privacy Framework,183 the Madrid Privacy Declaration184 or 
the UN General Assembly Resolution on The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age 
also need to be mentioned.185 The protection of respect for privacy in article 17 of 
the ICCPR could also serve as a starting point for work on an international data 
privacy framework.186 A resolution of the 35th International Conference of Data 
Protection and Privacy Commissioners recognised the ‘pressing need for a 
binding international agreement on data protection’ and urged national 
governments to advocate the adoption of an additional protocol to article 17 of 
the ICCPR to create globally applicable data protection standards.187 Expressing 
its deep concern about mass scale surveillance, interception and collection of 
personal information, the UN General Assembly Resolution on the Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age of 2013 put the issue on the agenda of the  
Human Rights Council and called upon states to review their surveillance 
practices and oversight mechanisms.188 It is an encouraging sign that unbridled 
state surveillance is increasingly acknowledged as an international human rights 
issue. 
 
IV    CONCLUSION 
There is growing recognition that data privacy can no longer be effectively 
guaranteed in the absence of internationally agreed standards and procedures. 
However, the international regulation of transborder data flows faces significant 
hurdles because the cultural and constitutional approaches towards (data) privacy 
differ dramatically between jurisdictions. While some regions, such as the EU, 
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185  GA Res 167, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 68th sess, 70th plen mtg, Agenda Item 69(b), UN Doc 
A/RES/68/167 (21 January 2014, adopted 18 December 2013).  
186  For a comparison with ECHR art 8, see Lee A Bygrave, ‘Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy 
in Human Rights Treaties’ (1998) 6 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 247, 252–
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regard privacy protection as a question of human rights and are currently in the 
process of enhancing their privacy standards even further, other countries have 
barely begun to acknowledge the importance of personal privacy protection. 
Australia and the US adopt positions in the middle ground. Their regulation is 
relatively ‘light touch’ because of a concern that excessive privacy protection has 
the potential to impose a significant regulatory burden on their businesses. 
Agreement on global privacy standards currently appears to be a distant 
vision. However, the increasing globalisation of data flows makes such an 
agreement ever more urgent and may prompt further efforts by governments. The 
most likely candidate for a world data privacy treaty is currently Convention 108 
of the Council of Europe, as it already has a significant number of European 
members and strikes a compromise between the high standards of data privacy 
within the EU and the less stringent standards in many other parts of the world. 
An unresolved question is whether such an international instrument would 
provide individuals with rights that could also be enforced internationally. 
Since 2001, government surveillance has emerged as one of the most 
significant threats to personal privacy. In the ongoing debate on surveillance, it 
has become increasingly apparent that intelligence agencies and law enforcement 
bodies are using the concern for national security to develop systems of mass 
surveillance that deeply affect the lives and freedoms of ordinary citizens. While 
the EU, the US and Australia adopt very different approaches to data privacy, 
they coincide in largely exempting national security agencies from compliance 
with general data protection laws. The conferral of new powers on national 
intelligence agencies for the purposes of counter-terrorism has further exposed 
the flaws of regulatory systems that provide insufficient protection of privacy in 
the context of state surveillance. In Australia, the US and some member states of 
the EU, legislators have begun the difficult task of assessing how oversight of 
surveillance activities can be improved without sacrificing counter-terrrorism 
capabilities. 
Surveillance as a counter-terrorism measure does not stop at national borders. 
The international phenomenon of terrorism requires international responses. 
Countries acquire increasingly sophisticated technology that can reach deeply 
into foreign communications and monitor data traffic without the knowledge or 
consent of governments or citizens affected by such measures. In other cases, 
governments enter into bilateral or multilateral cooperation arrangements. While 
agreements on information sharing require the parties to find a compromise on 
the appropriate level of data privacy in cross-border data flows, there is some, 
albeit limited, scope for national parliaments and popular constitutionalism to 
influence the extent and content of such international counter-terrorism 
cooperation. 
The international regulation of surveillance activities by counter-terrorism 
and intelligence agencies thus faces complex hurdles. It must contend with firmly 
entrenched differences in relation to the relative value and significance of privacy 
in various world regions and legal cultures. These differences are accentuated in 
the conflict between privacy and protection from the threat of international 
terrorism. Even if global agreement on general privacy standards could be 
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achieved, it is not likely that surveillance for the purposes of national security 
would be covered in an international treaty. Such activities are usually exempt 
from general privacy regulation in domestic law, and there is no indication that 
governments would agree to give up any of their policy discretion in such a core 
area of national sovereignty. The prospects for enhanced protection of individual 
privacy against further encroachment by national security agencies are therefore 
dim. However, the significance of privacy for personal freedom requires the 
sustained efforts of civil society and privacy advocates to take on this difficult 
mission. 
 
 
 
 
